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in what respect the essays should be "best" and therefore left it open
to the whim of the judge or chance. The court ruled that sufficient
appeared in the record to show that the contest was to be judged on
the basis of literary merit for advertising purposes. 10 In further
support of its ruling the court in the principal case cites Hoff v.
Daily Graphic, Inc., a New York case concerning a game involving
movie titles, wherein it was said, "The allegations in the complaint
clearly indicate the exercise of judgment and taste in the selection
of titles, both by the contestant and by the judges, and while taste
is to a certain extent individual, and perhaps at times fanciful, nevertheless the exercise of it is far removed from blind guesswork or
chance." 11
In those jurisdictions which have a lottery statute similar to the
one in New York ' 2 which does not provide that the distribution must
be by pure chance or by chance exclusively, but by chance, the determination of the character of a contest as a lottery or not is generally held to depend on which is the dominating element. Competitions in which skill or judgment is the predominant factor in
determining the winners will not be considered lotteries. The solution of the problem of which is the dominant element, skill or chance,
in borderline cases will vary with the jurisdiction.
K.R.

fORTS -

ASSAULT AND BATTERY -

NEGLIGENCE -

JOKE-STATUTE OF LIMITATION.-Plaintiff

PRACTICAL

instituted an action for

personal injuries resulting from "horse play" during a game of pitch
with the defendant and other friends. As the defendant stooped to
retrieve his money, he jokingly jerked the plaintiff's leg. Plaintiff's
chair was fitted with gliders, and since the linoleum was highly waxed,
the plaintiff fell over backwards, thereby injuring his back and suffering partial disability. Plaintiff filed his petition one and one-half
years after the cause of action accrued. Nebraska statutes provided
for a one-year assault and battery statute of limitation,' and for a
four-year general tort statute of limitation. 2 Defendant claimed the
10 Contra: People v. Rehm, 13 Cal. App. (Supp.) 2d 755, 57 P. 2d 238
(1936). Contest consisting of selecting titles for cartoons held to be a lottery.
"There is no standard by which one title can be said to be either 'best' or 'more
appropriate' than all others." State ex Inf. McKittrick Atty. Gen. v. GlobeDemocrat Pub. Co., 341 Mo. 862, 110 S. W. 2d 705 (1937).
11 Hoff v. Daily Graphic, Inc., 132 Misc. 597, 230 N. Y. Supp. 360 (Sup.
Ct. 1928). Contra: State ex Inf. McKittrick Atty. Gen. v. Globe-Democrat
Pub. Co., 341 Mo. 862, 110 S. W. 2d 715 (1937). The court therein states
that the Hoff case seems to be ruled on the English "pure chance" theory.
12 N. Y. PENAL CoDE §§ 1370-1386.
1Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-208 (1943).
2 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-207 (1943).
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injury was the result of assault and battery and that the one-year
statute of limitation 3 barred the action. Plaintiff appeals from a
judgment entered on a directed verdict for the defendant. Held,
judgment reversed. Defendant's act was one an ordinarily prudent
man would not have done. Since the plaintiff's injury resulted from
negligence, the four-year statute of limitation 4 applied. Newman v.
Christensen, 149 Neb. 471, 31 N. W. 2d 417 (1948).
The pivotal issue turned upon whether the defendant's act was
assault and battery or negligence. The Supreme Court of Nebraska
held it to be negligence, stating that, while there was an element of
intent present, the intention to commit an injury was lacking.5
While there is usually little difficulty in distinguishing between
an intentional and a negligent injury, there are cases in which the
distinction is, at best, a nice one.6 Where the injury results immediately from the wilful act of the defendant, assault and battery may
lie, but where the injury results indirectly from the acts of the defendant, though the acts which constitute the proximate cause were
done intentionally, a cause of action in negligence may be maintained.
Moreover, where the injury results from negligence, if it was the
immediate effect of the defendant's act, the injured plaintiff has an
election 7 to sue either in assault and battery or in negligence.8
"A person intends a result when he acts for the purpose of accomplishing it, or believes that the result is substantially certain to
follow from his act." 9 The intent need neither be a hostile one nor
one calculated to do a particular harm which might impose tort liability. The liability will follow if the intent manifests itself in an
evasion of the rights of another. Though an act is intended as a
practical joke,' 0 or one from which the actor honestly believed no
Rev. Stat. §25-208 (1943).
aNeb.
4
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-207 (1943).
5 "Although it may be true that every personal injury committed through
negligence is, strictly speaking, a 'battery,' within the common law definition,
it does not follow that the word 'battery,' as used in Section 25-208, R. S. 1943,
is to be construed to include all personal injury actions. The action for a
battery, . . . , is proper if founded upon an intentonally administered injury
to the person. But there is another class of cases in which the personal injury
occurred through the negligent act of one person, and such negligent acts do
not come within the definitions of assault and battery .

. .

. for the intention

to inflict the injury is entirely lacking." Newman v. Christensen, 149 Neb.
471, 31 N. W. 2d 417, 419 (1948). But see McGovern v. Weis, 265
App. Div. 367, 370, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 115 118 (4th Dep't 1943). See also
6 C. J. S., Assault and Battery § 11 (19375; 4 Amd. JUR., Assault and Battery
§ 3 (1936).
67 Kelly v. Lett, 35 N. C. 50 (1851).
Dalton v. Favour, 3 N. H. 465 (1826).
8 Thus, though the strictness for compliance with the common law forms
of action no longer obtains, "the ghosts of ancient common law forms of
action, long since obsolete, still walk through our courts." PROSSER, TORTS 36
(1941).
9 Id. at 40.
10 See Note, 9 A. L. R. 364 (1920).
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injury would result," the actor may still be held accountable for the
resulting injury.12 Thus the defendant has been held liable for injuries resulting from an invitation to see some "wild" women,'13 for
delivering a package containing a dead rat, 4 and for mixing gunpowder with tobacco to discourage a frequent tobacco borrower. 15
"On the other hand, the mere knowledge and appreciation of a
risk, short of substantial certainty, is not the equivalent of intent.
The defendant who acts in the belief or consciousness that he is
causing an appreciable risk of harm to another may be negligent, and
if the risk is great his conduct may be characterized as reckless or
wanton, but it is not classed as an intentional wrong." 16 The courts
have attempted to draw the line of demarcation between intentional
torts and negligent ones at the point where the risk ceases to be fore-7
seeable by a reasonable man and becomes an apparent certainty.
The element of foreseeability is also operative in distinguishing an
unavoidable accident-where the occurrence was not intended and
could not have been avoided or prevented even by the exercise of
reasonable care.' 8
The trend seems to manifest itself in the leading case of Reynolds
v. Pierson.'9 In that case the defendant jokingly, and without intent
to injure anyone, pulled his friend's arm so forcefully that the plaintiff, an elderly man leaning on the friend's arm, was thereby thrown
and injured. The Appellate Court of Indiana held the defendant
answerable in assault and battery by applying the doctrine of constructive intent. This appears to be the position taken by the majority, 20 and thus the principal case clearly falls out of line; for while
the defendant did not intend an injury, he did intend to cause a
physical contact.
Therefore, in the principal case, it appears as though the court
circumvented the statute of limitation to enable the plaintiff to pursue
11 Vosburg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523, 50 N. W. 403 (1891).
12 "The fact that a practical joke is the cause of the injury to a person
does not excuse the perpetrator from liability in damages for the injury
sustained." 52 Am. JUR., Torts § 90 (1945).
13 Johnston v. Pittard, 62 Ga. App. 550, 8 S. E. 2d 717 (1940).
'14 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 Atl. 22
(1931).
15 Parker v. Enslow, 102 Ill. 272, 40 Am. Rep. 588 (1882).
16 PRossER, ToRTs 42 (1941).
17 RESTATEMENT, ToRas § 13, Comment d, § 21 (1934).
18 Filippone v. Reisenburger, 135 App. Div. 707, 119 N. Y. Supp. 632 (2d
Dep't 1909); Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292 (1850). But when the act is
unlawful per se or is accompanied by a disregard of the possible and probable
consequences, there is no basis for excusing the act as an unavoidable accident.
1929 Ind. App. 273, 64 N. E. 484 (1902) ; People ex rel. Starvis v. Rogers,
170 Misc. 609, 610, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 722, 723 (City Ct. 1939).
20 Cf. Honeycutt v. Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co., 235 Ala. 507, 180 So. 91
(1938); Pizitz v. Bloomburgh, 206 Ala. 136, 89 So. 287 (1921); Mooney v.
Carter, 114 Colo. 267, 160 P. 2d 390 (1945); Fortier v. Stone, 79 N. H. 235,
107 At. 342 (1919).
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a remedy which otherwise might have been denied him, for there is
2
a dearth of respectable authority to support the position taken. '
It is submitted that the New York courts will not follow the view
set forth in the principal case. When an intent to engage in an unreasonable and unprivileged physical contact is clearly shown, and the
resulting injury, though not intended, is the natural and probable
consequence of the act, assault and battery is the proper remedy to
be pursued, 22 and, in New York, the two-year assault and battery
statute of limitation, 23 rather than the three-year negligence statute
of limitation, 24 is applicable.
H. I. L.
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A

GUEST STATUTE.-The defendant had transported plaintiff to a social
gathering. Before beginning the return trip, plaintiff entered defendant's automobile but alighted when defendant couldn't find the car
keys. The defendant inadvertently caused the vehicle to lurch backwards, thus striking the plaintiff. Defendant offers as a bar to this
action to recover for the injuries so sustained, Ohio Gen. Code Ann.
§ 6308-6 which states, in substance, that the owner, responsible for
the operation of a motor vehicle, shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to a guest, while being transported without
payment therefor in or upon said motor vehicle, resulting from the
operation thereof, unless such injuries are caused by the willful or
wanton misconduct of such operator. Defendant contends that the
phrase, in or upon said notor vehicle, should be construed as to include a mere temporary interruption in the transportation as the
alighting of plaintiff in this case, and, as a matter of law, that plaintiff
was being transported as a guest at the time she was struck. Held,
judgment for the plaintiff. To hold as defendant contends would
require the elimination from the statute of the words, "in or upon
said motor vehicle." Eshelman v. Wilson, - Ohio App. -, 80 N. E.
2d 803 (1948).
The common law of most states has placed the gratuitous automobile guest in much the same position as a mere invitee concerning
defects in the vehicle; the owner is responsible only for injuries
21 Johnston v. Pittard, 62 Ga. App. 550, 8 S. E. 2d 717 (1940); Baltimore
City Pass. Ry. v. Tanner, 90 Md. 315, 45 AtI. 188 (1900); Koons v. Rook,

295 S. W. 592 (Tex. Com. App. 1927), affirming Rook v. Koons, 289 S. W.
107722 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
McGovern v. Weis, 265 App. Div. 367, 370, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 115, 118 (4th
Dep't 1943); Gage v. Bewley, 160 N. Y. Supp. 1111 (Co. Ct. 1916), aff'd
mnem., 175 App. Div. 914, 160 N. Y. Supp. 1131 (4th Dep't 1916); Noonan v.
Luther, 206 N. Y. 105, 99 N. E. 178 (1912).
23N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 50.
24 N.

Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr § 49.

